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Abstract 
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THE SEPARATIO OF OWERSHIP AD COTROL AD IVESTMET 
DECISIOS I MEXICA MAUFACTURIG FIRMS 
 
1. Introduction 
Traditional financial management theory explains the behavior of firms in terms of the 
maximization of value and profits. In practice, such behavior also depends on how the 
stakeholders determine and control the strategic direction and performance of firms (i.e. 
corporate governance practices). Particularly, one of the main determinants of how the 
stakeholders take and execute such decisions is the degree of separation between 
ownership and control.  
 
The separation between ownership and control occurs due to the asymmetric interests of 
managers and owners regarding firms´ behavior. The separation usually materializes in 
difficulties to enforce corporate control by the owners. Such difficulties are the so-called 
agency costs (Ang et al., 2000). This is the reason why agency theory focuses on how the 
owners can motivate management to pursue owners´ goals.  
 
Here we investigate how the separation of ownership and control influences investment 
decisions on Mexican manufacturing firms. We study them with aggregate indexes and 
the assessment of several regression sets. Corporate governance studies for emerging 
economies, like the Mexican one, are scarce. We focus on manufacturing firms because 
the promotion of their activities has been considered necessary to encourage the 
development of emerging economies (Nurkse, 1953; Lewis, 1954).  
 
Our study has some distinctive features that differentiate it with respect to other studies. 
A first feature is that we focus on the effects of the separation of ownership and control in 
an emerging economy. A second one is that we explicitly introduce the size dimension 
according to the proposals of Crespi & Schellato (2007). The last one is that we control 
for the effects of certain firms characteristics (cash flow and investment opportunities).   
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This investigation follows several steps. First, we build aggregate indexes of ownership, 
management and agency costs based on longitudinal census data for the 182 industries 
that includes the manufacturing sector (INEGI, 2004). Then we estimate several OLS 
regressions to analyze the determinants of investment for micro, small, medium and large 
size firms.  Finally, we use several statistical tests to check the robustness of our results. 
 
Our findings support the claim that agency costs and the size of firms can explain 
investment decisions. An increase in operating-expense ratio, a proxy for agency costs, 
increases fixed capital formation among firms. Furthermore the estimators support the 
necessity to include the firm´s size, investment opportunities and cash flow as 
explanatory variables.  The coefficients associated to such variables are mostly 
significant and positive. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature. Section 3 describes 
the methodological design of the research. Particularly it focuses on the description of the 
data, indicators, model specifications and econometric techniques. Section 4 shows the 
assessment outcomes. It also includes further statistical estimations and tests to support 
the empirical assessments. Section 5 discusses the main findings. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Literature review and background 
Here we review the literature relevant for our investigation. First we review the literature 
that describes the relationships between the separation of ownership and control and 
agency costs. Then we review some studies that focus on the relationship between 
corporate governance and investment decisions. Later we focus on recent papers that 
emphasize the importance of firm size for investment decisions. Finally we review the 
literature of corporate governance in the context of the Mexican economy. 
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2.1 The separation of ownership and control and agency costs 
Traditionally, corporate governance studies assume that the owners of corporations do 
not have full authority to determine corporate practices. Such lack of control is justified 
in terms of the asymmetric interests of managers and owners (Berle & Means, 1932). 
Indeed, many corporate governance studies, under this assumption, analyze how the 
separation of ownership and control may affect the decision-making process of the firms. 
 
Theoretically, the separation between ownership and control has been analyzed in terms 
of the principal-agent framework. Under such framework, corporate decisions and agency 
costs are explained in terms of the asymmetries of interests of the stakeholders in the firm 
(Daily et al., 2003). Moreover, an increase in the degree of separation between ownership 
and control increases agency costs (Ang et al., 2000).  
 
Agency costs are essential to explain the separation between ownership and control. 
These costs include the ones associated to the risk that the agents will take advantage of 
the firm for their own benefit. Other costs relate to the resources needed to provide 
incentives and align the interests of owners and managers. Paradoxically, in spite of their 
importance, studies that measure these costs only exist since the late 1980`s (McKnight & 
Weir, 2009).  
 
The limited evidence regarding agency costs explains why the separation between 
ownership and control has been recently questioned. Particularly, Cheffins & Bank 
(2009), after analyzing various studies conducted between 1930´s and 1980`s among US 
firms, conclude that corporate governance has never been characterized by such 
separation. Moreover, they argue that this separation only exists when owners delegate 
authority on employees.  
 
We believe that further studies regarding the separation between ownership and control 
must include measures of ownership, management and agency costs.  We need such 
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studies to assess the pertinence of the principal-agent framework and to improve our 
understanding of corporate governance practices. This consideration justifies why in this 
study we include such measures for empirical purposes.  
 
2.2 Investment decisions and corporate governance 
Financial economics considers that firms are flows of financial streams that depend on 
investments (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Such consideration explains why the study of 
optimal investment decisions and their determinants is an important research field from a 
financial perspective. Indeed, the long-term performance of firms cannot be understood 
without understanding their investment decisions. 
 
Some studies suggest that investment decisions depend on corporate governance 
practices. Andres (2008) argues that high levels of concentration between ownership and 
control are associated with high levels of investment. He arrives to such conclusion by 
analyzing panel-data of non-financial German firms. Indeed his findings suggest that 
efficient investment decisions, low agency conflicts and small information asymmetries 
occur mainly in family firms.  
 
Syriopoulos et al. (2007) support the importance of the corporate governance processes. 
Concretely, they find a direct relationship between ownership concentration and market 
value of Greek firms. In their study, such relationship depends on investment decisions. 
Moreover, in their study they show how different ownership structures may influence the 
allocation of firms´ resources.  
 
However, some studies do not support the previous claims. Madden (1982) finds that 
stock market performance, a measure of expected financial streams, is independent of the 
relative separation of ownership from control. He arrives to such conclusion after 
comparing the performance of 199 industrial corporations. Thus, according to his 
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findings, at least financial investment may not depend on specific corporate governance 
practices. 
 
The previous studies show that the nature of the relationship among investment and 
corporate governance remains unclear. Some studies have analyzed it with qualitative 
methodologies to gain some insight and further knowledge. Among them, the one of 
Danielson & Scott (2007) suggests that overinvestment occurs when firms have non-
concentrated ownership and control structures. However what seems clear is that further 
research may be necessary to clarify such relationship. 
 
2.3 Investment and firm size 
Traditionally, the size of firms is considered an important variable to analyze competitive 
and behavioral issues. Recently, it has been used to analyze corporate governance issues. 
Particularly, Crespi & Schellato (2007) believe that such variable is important to 
understand the relationships among the degree of concentration of the ownership, control 
structure and firm investment behavior.  
 
Bøhren et al. (2007) suggest that the size of the firms is necessary to understand corporate 
governance practices. They find that good practices drive managers to invest and to exert 
effort to find productive investment projects. Moreover, these practices seem to improve 
the efficiency of capital allocation in US manufacturing firms. They arrive to such 
conclusions by controlling cash flow and investment opportunities.  
 
The comparative study of Gugler et al. (2007) confirms the relevance of the size of the 
firms. They arrive to such conclusion by analyzing the determinants of investment 
decisions under different corporate governance regimes in Anglo Saxon and European 
Continental firms. Moreover, their findings suggest that the separation of ownership and 
control, agency costs and investment decisions are closely related. 
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The existence of a positive relationship between the size of firm and its levels of 
investment is explained in terms of the facilities that large firms may have to acquire 
external funds. However, in spite of this belief, some studies suggest that this claim is not 
necessarily true, at least for OECD countries (Kadapakkam et al., 1998). Thus, further 
research seems necessary to clarify the nature of such relationship.  
 
2.4 Corporate governance in the Mexican economy 
Some economists believe that good corporate governance practices contribute to foster 
economic growth (Claessens, 2006). Such belief relies on the effects that such practices 
may on productive investment. Particularly, it is believed that in emerging economies, 
good corporate governance practices may alleviate the problems associated to the 
existence of incomplete and imperfect markets and weak institutional frameworks that 
characterize such economies.  
 
The potential benefits of good corporate practices in emerging economies seem 
extraordinary. Among other benefits, they could allow access to these economies to 
external funds, reduce their capital costs, improve the operational performance of their 
firms and improve the relationships among firms´ stakeholders (Claessens, 2006). Indeed 
the study of corporate governance practices seems a natural research field for 
development studies.  
 
Paradoxically, most corporate governance studies focus on developed economies, not on 
emerging ones. Several problems regarding the collection of corporate data in such 
economies explain such situation. Furthermore the existence of alternative objective 
functions and behavioral mechanisms among firms complicates further the development 
of such studies (Allen, 2005). Indeed the literature on these economies, like the Mexican 
one, is scarce. 
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In Mexico most corporate governance studies study firms listed in the local exchange 
market. Such studies are fairly recent and are mainly descriptive. Among them, the one of 
Castrillo & San Martin (2007) analyze the structures of ownership and control in family 
firms. The study concludes that the concentration of such structures reduces principal-
agent problems. Theoretically such findings have been explained by Castillo-Ponce 
(2007). 
 
Ruiz-Porras & Steinwascher-Sacio (2008) analyze the relationships among corporate 
governance, diversification strategies and financial performance for a sample of 99 non-
financial firms. Their findings show that in firms where property is concentrated there is 
an orientation toward the domestic market. They also find that there are no trends, 
regarding strategies and performance, related to the separation between ownership and 
control. 
 
The previous studies on corporate governance do not focus on manufacturing firms. 
Moreover, none of them focuses on agency costs, investment decisions or firm size. 
Indeed, to the best of our knowledge, studies on the relationships among the empirical 
effects of corporate governance in the manufacturing sector do not exist for Latin 
American economies. We believe that further research may be necessary, particularly, for 
development purposes. 
 
3. Methodology 
Here we describe the methodological design of our investigation. Specifically, we 
describe the sources of data and the indicators used in the econometric assessments. 
Furthermore we describe the econometric modeling and testing procedures used to 
analyze the relationships among the separation of ownership and control, agency costs 
and investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms.  
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3.1 Data sources 
We use data from the “Economic Census 2003” reported by the Mexican Bureau of 
Statistics (INEGI). Such census is constructed accordingly to the North-American-
Industry-Classification-System (NAICS). We use a longitudinal data set because previous 
censuses are built with non-comparable methodologies. In Mexico census data are 
collected every five years. Currently, data for the census collected in 2008 are not 
available.  
 
Firm-level data are not available due to confidentiality reasons. Here we deal with such 
constraint by constructing a set of four representative firms for each of the 182 industries 
included in the census. We build the representative firms accordingly to the number of 
employees. A micro firm has no more than 10 employees. A small firm has between 11 
and 50. A medium firm has between 51 and 250. A large firm has at least 251 employees.  
 
The Mexican census classifies firms of each industry into groups according to the number 
of employees. The census includes 12 classificatory groups for each of the 182 industries. 
We do not follow this classification system due to its complexity. We use a simplified 
one that only includes four groups. The simplified system follows the one of the Mexican 
Economics Ministry. For comparative purposes, Table 1 shows the relationships between 
both systems. 
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Table 1: The census and the Mexican Economics Ministry classifications for the 
firms of an industry 
 
Census´ Classification 
of Firms in the Industry 
i 
(t) 
Employees in the 
Firms that Belong to 
Group t 
Mean of Employees in 
the Firms that Belong 
to Group t 
(Mjt) 
Type of Firm 
According to the 
Mexican Economics 
Ministry´ classification 
1 0-2 1 Micro 
2 3-5 4 Micro 
3 6-10 8 Micro 
4 11-15 13 Small 
5 16-20 18 Small 
6 21-30 25 Small 
7 31-50 40 Small 
8 51-100 75 Medium 
9 101-250 175 Medium 
10 251-500 375 Large 
11 501-1000 750 Large 
12 1000+  Large 
The table shows the relationships between the Economic Census´ classification and the one of the Mexican 
Economics Ministry. The census classifies firms of each industry into groups according to the number of 
employees. The census has 12 classificatory groups for each of the 182 industries. The Mexican Economics 
Ministry´ classification for manufacturing firms considers four types. A micro firm has no more than 10 
employees. A small firm has between 11 and 50. A medium firm has between 51 and 250. A large firm has 
at least 251 employees. The mean of employees for the firms of the twelfth group is the average of 
employees with respect to the total of firms in the twelfth group. 
 
We build each representative firm in order to describe the behavior for the representative 
firm of size “j” of industry “i”. We estimate a weighted variable to assess the effects of 
the size of the firms according to the classification system proposed by the Mexican 
Economics Ministry. We use as weight the mean of the number of employees by each 
type of firm.  The representative firm variable is calculated as follows:   
12...,1,t
43,2,1,j
182...,1,i
Mn
Mn
P
t
jtijt
jtijt
ijt
=
=
=
=
∑
               (1) 
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where Pijt is the weighted indicator of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”; nijt is the 
number of firms of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”; Mjt is the mean of the number of 
employees of size “j” in group “t”; the subindex “i” refers to the i-th industry; the 
subindex “j” refers to the firm of size “j” (micro, small, medium and large firms); the 
subindex “t” refers to the t-th groups included in the size-j classification. 
 
We build representative variables for all the independent and dependent variables. We 
use the weighted indicator of each one of the four representative firms of industry i to 
estimate each variable. We multiply Pijt by each variable included in the census 
classification for each one of the twelve groups of firms Vijt. Such multiplications added 
accordingly to each subindex “t” provide us with a variable each representative firm of 
size “j” of the industry “i”.   
12...,1,t
43,2,1,j
182...,1,i
t
ijt
V
ijt
P
ij
RF
=
=
=
∑=
              (2) 
where RFij is a variable associated to the representative firm of the industry “i”, size “j”; 
Pijt is the weighted indicator of the industry “i”, size “j”, group “t”.  
 
We should emphasize that the methodological approach developed here allows us to 
describe the behavior of representative firms.  Particularly, it allows us to describe and 
capture aggregate trends of behavior of firms that belong to a particular industry and size. 
Representative firm variables are aggregate indexes. Hence the approach does not allow 
us to analyze the behavior of specific firms.  
 
3.2 Variables 
Here we describe the main aggregate variables (indexes) used in our econometric study. 
Particularly, here we use the independent variables as proxies of the ownership and 
control structures. We follow the proposals of Ang et al. (2000), Bøhren et al. (2007) and 
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Danielson & Scott (2007) to use such variables. The set of dependent, independent and 
control variables is summarized in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Investment and its determinants (variables) 
 
Variables (Indexes) Measures    Indicator of the census 
Dependent variable 
Investment  Fixed capital expenditures Gross fixed capital formation 
(Value of the fixed assets 
bought minus the value of the 
fixed assets sold) 
Independent Variables 
Ownership Ownership index Ratio of owners, relatives and 
other employees non-
remunerated to total employees  
Management Management index Ratio of management 
employees to remunerated 
employees  
Operating-expenses ratio  Agency costs 1 Ratio of operating expenses to 
annual sales 
Asset-utilization ratio Agency costs 2 
 
Ratio of annual sales to total 
assets 
Econometric control variables  
Investment opportunities Ratio of output to capital Ratio of production value to 
fixed capital stock 
Cash flow Earnings  Net earnings  
Firm size Fixed assets Total value of fixed assets 
The table shows the variables and indicators used in the econometric assessments. The dependent variable 
is investment. The independent variables aim to capture the main features of the ownership and control 
structures.   The table includes the definitions of the variables according to the Economic Census of INEGI 
(Mexican Bureau of Statistics). 
 
The set of independent variables includes proxies for the relevance of ownership and 
management. We follow Bøhren et al. (2007) to build them. We include these indexes for 
completeness and consistency with traditional corporate governance studies. These 
variables, in addition to the agency cost ones, aim to capture the effects of the ownership 
and control structures on investment decisions. 
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We follow Ang et al. (2000) and Danielson & Scott (2007) to build the agency cost 
indexes. We assume that agency costs reflect the degree of separation between ownership 
and control. We use two alternative measures of agency costs. The first one is the ratio of 
operating expenses to annual assets (operating-expenses ratio). The second measure is the 
asset utilization ratio, which is defined as the ratio of annual sales to total assets. 
 
The agency cost indexes are in reality measures that indicate how effectively the firm’s 
management controls operating costs and deploys its assets. When the operating expenses 
ratio increases we assume that occur a decrease in efficiency. When the asset utilization 
ratio increases there is an increase of resources controlled by management. Here we use 
both proxy measures of agency costs for consistency and completeness with the previous 
studies. 
 
3.3 Modeling specification and econometric techniques 
Econometrically, we use a log-linear functional form specification to describe the 
relationships among ownership, management, agency costs and investment. Such 
specification allows the regression coefficients to measure the elasticity of investment 
with respect to each independent variable (determinant). Moreover, the log 
transformation reduces the possibility of heteroscedasticity problems.  
 
Our assessment approach uses three sets of regressions for comparison purposes. The first 
set includes the whole set of ownership, management and agency costs measures. The 
second one includes only the ownership and management ones. The third set includes the 
agency cost ones. Each set is integrated by four regressions that focus on a specific type 
of firm (micro, small, medium and large).  Thus the model specification set is: 
 
ijij7ij6ij5ij4ij3ij2ij10ij SlnCFlnIOlnAUlnOElnClnOlnIln ε+α+α+α+α+α+α+α+α=         (3) 
 
ijij5ij4ij3ij2ij10ij SlnCFlnIOlnClnOlnIln ε+α+α+α+α+α+α=                      (4)  
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ijij5ij4ij3ij2ij10ij SlnCFlnIOlnAUlnOElnIln ε+α+α+α+α+α+α=                      (5)  
where Iij is investment; Oij is the ownership index; Cij represents the management index; 
OEij is the operating expenses ratio; AUij represents the asset utilization ratio; IOij 
represents the investment opportunities; CFij is cash flow; Sij is the size of the firm; εij is 
the random error term. 
 
We use the Ordinary-Least-Squares (OLS) technique to develop the regression analysis. 
Statistically the OLS technique provides us the best linear unbiased estimators (BLUE) 
under certain assumptions.  Such assumptions include: 1) Linearity of the parameters; 2) 
Normality, ijε ~ ( )2,0N σ ; 3) Homoscedasticity, 2ij ][VAR σ=ε ; 4)  Normality, 
0]X,[COV iij =ε ; 5) No specification bias in the model; and 6) No perfect multicollinearity. 
 
The adequacy of the OLS technique and the robustness of our results are supported with 
several tests. Concretely, we use pairwise correlation analysis to assess the degree of 
collinearity among the explanatory variables. In addition, we use Jarque-Bera tests to 
assess the normality of residuals and Breusch-Pagan tests to detect heteroscedasticity in 
all the regressions. Furthermore, we use specification-error Ramsey tests to assess the 
assumptions regarding the functional specification form and to detect omitted-variable 
bias.   
 
The design of the investigation aims at studying the following hypothesis: 
i. Agency costs as a measure of the separation between ownership and control may 
influence investment decisions. 
ii. The size of the firms is necessary to understand corporate governance practices 
and investment decisions. 
iii. Firm and environmental characteristics (cash flow and investment opportunities) 
may influence investment decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms. 
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4. Empirical assessment  
We begin by exploring the correlations between the agency cost proxies and between the 
ownership and management indexes. Concretely, we use pairwise correlation analysis to 
assess the degree of collinearity between the operating-expenses and asset-utilization 
ratios. We also estimate the correlations between the ownership and management 
indexes. We summarize the statistical results in Table 3.  
 
Table 3. Correlations between the agency cost variables and between the ownership 
and management indexes 
 
Firm Size Correlations between agency cost 
variables 
Correlations between ownership and 
management variables 
Micro 0.0474 
(0.526) 
0.1506** 
(0.0431) 
Small 0.0858 
(0.2509) 
0.7148*** 
(0.0000) 
Medium  -0.0842 
(0.2651) 
0.301*** 
(0.0000) 
Large  -0.0881 
(0.2503) 
0.2719*** 
(0.0003) 
The estimations use pairwise correlations. The agency cost variables include the asset-utilization and 
operating-expenses ratios. The ownership and management variables include the ratio of owners to total 
employees and the ratio of managers to total remunerated employees.  Significance levels are given in 
parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
Table 3 suggests that both measures of agency costs are complementary in the Mexican 
manufacturing firms. The non significant correlation between both measures of agency 
costs shows that the degree of multicollinearity is low and that they should be treated as 
statistically independent. Such correlations do seem to depend on the size of firms. These 
findings support the functional-specifications forms proposed in equations (3) and (5).    
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Table 4 reports the regression outcomes for the first set of regressions defined by 
equation (3). It suggests that ownership and management may be separated among 
manufacturing firms. In each regression the coefficients associated to both types of 
measures have opposite signs. Indeed, the outcomes suggest that the relevance of such 
separation depends on the size of the firms.  
 
Interestingly, the outcomes support the claim that agency costs are necessary to 
understand corporate governance decisions. Indeed all the coefficients associated to the 
operating expense ratio index are positive and mostly significant.  Moreover the 
significant coefficients associated to the asset utilization ratio share such positive sign. 
The interpretation of such findings suggests that an increase in agency costs increases 
investment among firms. 
 
Statistically, the estimators support the adequacy of the proposed regression models. In 
all cases, the R
2
 estimators are high enough. In addition, the joint significance F-test 
estimators suggest that all the independent variables are necessary. Furthermore the 
estimators support the necessity to include the firm´s size and cash flow variables as 
explanatory variables.  The coefficients associated to both variables are mostly significant 
and positive. 
 
Finally, we should point out that the adequacy of the estimations is supported by 
additional tests. As it known, the OLS method provides efficient estimations when the 
errors are normally distributed and have homoscedastic variances. In the regression 
models analyzed here, the Jarque-Bera tests do not reject the null hypothesis of normality. 
Furthermore the Breusch-Pagan tests do not reject the null hypothesis of 
homoscedasticity. 
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Table 4.  Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican 
manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include all the 
independent variables) 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large   
Regresión indicators 
Ownership 0.45*** 
(3.21) 
-0,10 
(-1.12) 
-0.07 
(-1.15) 
-0.06 
(-1.02) 
Management -0.49*** 
(-4.32) 
0.48*** 
(2.90) 
0.17 
(0.66) 
0.20 
(1.20) 
Operating-expenses ratio  0.43** 
(2.28) 
0.30 
(1.10) 
0.84** 
(1.98) 
0.67* 
(1.91) 
Asset-utilization ratio  0.01* 
(1.88) 
0.002 
(0.31) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
0.002 
(0.22) 
Investment opportunities -0.01 
(-0.05) 
0.48*** 
(2.68) 
-0.07 
(-0.29) 
0.67*** 
(3.18) 
Cash flor 0.31*** 
(2.83) 
0.01 
(0.06) 
0.30*** 
(3.30) 
0.13* 
(1.85) 
Size  0.48*** 
(3.79) 
1.09*** 
(9.41) 
0.66*** 
(5.76) 
0.83*** 
(9.25) 
Constant -5.40*** 
(-4.75) 
-9.93*** 
(-7.09) 
-4.52** 
(-2.52) 
-4.37*** 
(-3.77) 
Observations 181 181 177 172 
F 133.21*** 103.82*** 36.27*** 92.76*** 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R
2
  0.84 0.81 0.60 0.80 
Jarque-Bera 3.25 2.86 1.99 1.34 
Prob > χ2 0.14 0.16 0.21 0.35 
Breusch-Pagan 5.61 2.09 4.51 0.68 
Prob > χ2 0.17 0.33 0.24 0.40 
The dependent variable is investment. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks 
indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.   
 
Table 5 reports the regression outcomes for the second set of regressions defined by 
equation (4). It seems to confirm that ownership and management may be separated. 
Again, the coefficients associated to such measures have opposite signs.  Moreover, the 
outcomes confirm that the size of the firms is important. In medium and large firms, 
investment increases as long as the proportion of management employees increases.    
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The estimators support the proposed regression models and confirm our previous 
findings. Again, the main statistical regression estimators suggest that the independent 
and control variables are necessary. The coefficients associated to investment 
opportunities, cash flow and the size of the firm variables are mostly significant and 
positive. Moreover the Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the adequacy of the 
estimation method. 
 
Table 5. Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican 
manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include the ownership 
and management determinants) 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large   
Regresión indicators 
Ownership 0.53*** 
(3.82) 
-0.09 
(-1.02) 
-0.09 
(-1.60) 
-0.08 
(-1.33) 
Management -0.42*** 
(-3.74) 
0.55*** 
(3.63) 
0.35 
(1.46) 
0.28* 
(1.79) 
Investment opportunities -0.02 
(-0.13) 
0.55*** 
(3.22) 
-0.11 
(-0.46) 
0.71*** 
(3.35) 
Cash flor 0.21** 
(2.10) 
-0.07 
(-0.91) 
0.22*** 
(2.68) 
0.05 
(0.83) 
Size  0.57*** 
(4.76) 
1.15*** 
(11.74) 
0.69*** 
(6.12) 
0.85*** 
(9.38) 
Constant -5.81*** 
(-5.26) 
-10.23*** 
(-7.59) 
-4.19** 
(-2.33) 
-3.65*** 
(-3.34) 
Observations 181 181 177 172 
F 177.53*** 145.62*** 49.43*** 127.69*** 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R
2
  0.84 0.81 0.59 0.79 
Jarque-Bera 3.55 2.96 2.29 1.47 
Prob > χ2 0.13 0.15 0.20 0.25 
Breusch-Pagan 7.12 1.72 4.17 0.70 
Prob > χ2 0.15 0.39 0.27 0.40 
The dependent variable is investment. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks 
indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  
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Table 6 reports the regression outcomes for the third set of regressions defined by 
equation (5). It confirms that agency costs are necessary to understand corporate 
governance decisions. Indeed all the coefficients associated to the operating expense ratio 
determinant are positive and significant. Interestingly, the results also suggest that the 
asset utilization ratio may not be a determinant of investment decisions. 
 
Table 6.  Investment decisions and ownership and control structure in Mexican 
manufacturing firms (OLS regressions – Regressions that include the agency cost 
determinants) 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large   
Regression indicators 
Operating-expenses ratio  0.48** 
(2.45) 
0.58** 
(2.37) 
0.99** 
(2.52) 
0.84** 
(2.51) 
Asset-utilization ratio  0.009 
(1.17) 
0.0005 
(0.07) 
0.001 
(0.13) 
-0.00008 
(-0.01) 
Investment opportunities 0.28** 
(2.11) 
0.47** 
(2.57) 
-0.05 
(-0.18) 
0.67*** 
(3.24) 
Cash flor 0.19* 
(1.76) 
0.05 
(0.51) 
0.34*** 
(3.98) 
0.19*** 
(3.13) 
Size  0.82*** 
(6.82) 
1.01*** 
(9.25) 
0.66*** 
(5.87) 
0.77*** 
(11.73) 
Constant -8.43*** 
(-8.30) 
-11.10*** 
(-8.22) 
-5.39*** 
(-3.49) 
-4.65*** 
(-4.13) 
Observations 181 181 177 172 
F 152.68*** 138.40*** 50.66*** 129.25*** 
Prob > F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
R
2
  0.81 0.80 0.60 0.80 
Jarque-Bera 3.74 2.54 1.85 1.57 
Prob > χ2 0.11 0.19 0.22 0.23 
Breusch-Pagan 6.09 5.24 5.17 1.26 
Prob > χ2 0.13 0.22 0.23 0.38 
The dependent variable is investment. The t-statistics are given in parenthesis. One, two and three asterisks 
indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively.  
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The estimators support the proposed regression models and confirm our previous 
findings. Once more, the statistical regression estimators suggest that the independent and 
control variables may be necessary to understand investment decisions. Again, the 
coefficients of the firm variables are mostly significant and positive. Furthermore the 
Jarque-Bera and Breusch-Pagan tests confirm the adequacy of the estimation method. 
 
The robustness of the regression models is assessed with Ramsey tests. Such tests are 
used to detect omitted variable-bias and/or incorrect functional forms. Here we use two 
versions of such test. The first one, the traditional RESET test, uses powers of the 
estimated independent variable as regressors. The second one uses powers of the RHS 
variables. The null hypothesis in both versions of the test is that the model is adequately 
specified (see Table 7). 
 
The Ramsey tests suggest that the regressions for the medium and large firms do not have 
specification errors. Such conclusion holds with independence of the regression set 
assessed. However, this is not the case for the regressions used to assess the determinants 
of investment in micro and small firms. Such finding suggests that the relevance of the 
ownership and management structures may be questionable under statistical basis.   
 
We summarize our findings by indicating that the evidence supports the claim that 
agency costs and the size of firms can explain investment decisions. An increase in 
operating expense ratio increases fixed capital formation among firms. Furthermore the 
estimators support the necessity to include the firm´ size, investment opportunities and 
cash flow as explanatory variables. The coefficients associated to all variables are mostly 
significant and positive. 
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Table 7. Specification tests for the regression models 
 
Firm size Micro Small  Medium Large   
Regressions that include all the independent variables 
RESET test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables 
8.16*** 6.07*** 0.73 0.60 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0006 0.5330 0.6171 
RHS-Ramsey test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables) 
1.93** 1.81** 1.20 1.39 
Prob > F 0.0126 0.0222 0.2581 0.1336 
Regressions that include the ownership control indexes 
RESET test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables 
10.45*** 6.28*** 1.15 0.87 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0005 0.3308 0.4594 
RHS-Ramsey test 
 (H0: model has no omitted variables) 
2.97*** 2.04** 1.46 1.50 
Prob > F 0.0003 0.0156 0.1256 0.1105 
Regressions that include the agency cost indexes  
RESET test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables 
11.74*** 8.34*** 1.03 1.02 
Prob > F 0.0000 0.0000 0.3788 0.3840 
RHS-Ramsey test 
(H0: model has no omitted variables) 
3.32*** 2.53*** 1.21 1.30 
Prob > F 0.0001 0.0022 0.2698 0.2108 
This table shows results of specification-form Ramsey test for the three sets of investment-determinant 
regressions.  Here we show shows two versions of such test. The first one, the traditional RESET test, uses 
powers of the estimated independent variable as regressors. The second one uses powers of the RHS 
variables. One, two and three asterisks indicate significance levels of 10, 5 and 1 percent respectively. 
 
5. Discussion 
We have assessed the econometric relationships between ownership and control structure 
with investment decisions in Mexican manufacturing firms from an aggregate 
perspective. Our findings support the hypotheses that the separation between ownership 
and control and the size of the firms may influence corporate governance practices and 
investment decisions. Furthermore, they also support the claim that certain firm and 
environmental characteristics may influence them.  
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The findings reported here regarding agency costs and the size of the firm are consistent 
with other studies. Particularly they are consistent with the ones of Ang et al. (2000) and 
Danielson & Scott (2007). The former study finds that the degree of separation between 
ownership and control (represented by agency costs) has a positive relationship with firm 
size. The second study provides an explanation on the basis of managerial considerations. 
 
However, we should point out that our findings do no limit themselves to the 
determination of the significant determinants of investment. They also suggest that the 
ownership and management control indexes and the asset-utilization ratio are not 
determinants of investment decisions. Furthermore, they suggest that the econometric 
modeling structure proposed is adequate mainly for medium and large firms. 
 
We believe that the specification-error problems in the models for the micro and small 
firms may occur due to the omission of relevant non-measurable variables. Such belief 
relies on the qualitative study developed by Ekanem & Smallbone (2007). In their study 
they suggest that the intuition, the social networks and the experience of the 
entrepreneurs may be additional determinants of investment in small firms.  
 
Finally, it is important to emphasize that our empirical methodology allows us to describe 
and capture trends that occur on representative firms and it is useful only for data that 
fulfill certain statistical requirements. The violation of some statistical assumptions or the 
usage of non-aggregated data may modify its usefulness as an analytical tool.  Hence, we 
should recognize that the features of data available define the scope and limits of the 
methodology and the analysis developed. 
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6. Conclusions 
We have studied how the ownership and control structures may explain investment 
decisions of Mexican manufacturing firms with census data. We have studied them with 
aggregate indexes and the assessment of several regression sets. We have used measures 
of ownership, management and agency costs for the 182 industries that integrate the 
manufacturing sector.  The econometric analysis has involved OLS regression techniques 
and several statistical tests.  
 
The evidence supports the claim that agency costs, as a measure of the separation of 
ownership and control can explain investment decisions. Particularly we find that an 
increase in operating expense ratio increases fixed capital formation among firms. 
Furthermore the estimations support the necessity to include the size of the firms, 
investment opportunities and cash flow as explanatory variables.  The coefficients 
associated to all variables are mostly significant and positive. 
 
We believe that our investigation provides some ideas for further research. For example, 
extensions of our study may be used to analyze investment decisions in the financial and 
non-financial sectors. The “Economic Census 2008”, when available, may provide data 
useful for comparison purposes. Furthermore, our results suggest that further studies on 
the determinants of investments in micro and small firms in emerging economies may be 
necessary. 
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